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Control: 17042

RECD: JULY 23, 1962

10:34 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 41, JULY 23, 9 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTIVITIES

(RELEASE (REF CLASSIFY

EXEMPT (DEFERRED BY PART

MACT (DENY (REFUSE

(NON-PERIODICALS)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 41, INFORMATION PARIS 97.
LONDON 79, MOSCOW 26, BONN 6 BERLIN 3.

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO STOESSEL MCGUIRE

RE SECTO 30 POUCHED ADDRESSEE POSTS, SENT MOSCOW 25.

KOHLER BRIEFED BRITISH AND GERMANS TODAY ON SECRETARY'S TWO AND HALF HOUR AFTER-DINNER CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO LAST NIGHT. FRENCH ABSENT FROM BRIEFING BECAUSE OF LACK QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

KOHLER BASED BRIEFING ON REFTEL PREFACING IT WITH ANALYSIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT APPROACH TO SOVIETS HERE, I.E., TO STAND COMPLETELY FIRM ON ISSUE OF WESTERN TROOP PRESENCE BERLIN. THIS SEEMED BEST POSSIBILITY THIS STAGE TO DIVERT SOVS FROM SIGNING SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR AND THE CONSEQUENCES THEY SAY THIS WOULD HAVE FOR WEST. ALTERNATIVELY, THIS TACTIC MIGHT MAKE SOVS AT LEAST MORE CAUTIOUS IN IMPLEMENTING THOSE PROVISIONS OF TREATY WHICH COULD CAUSE TROUBLE FOR ALLIES.

IN GENERAL DISCUSSION AFTERWARDS FOLLOWING POINTS MADE:

1. KOHLER NOTED LONG GROMYKO STATEMENT IN JULY 21 TALK (SECTO 30) WHICH MOST OF SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION ADDRESSED WAS REWRITING OF THIS STATEMENT JULY 12 TO 13/14 KROSHNEV INTERVIEW WITH US SECRETARY JULY 14. STATEMENT TEAFTER THAN ACTUAL CONVERSATION

2. ALL AGREED TALKS PRESENT UNPLEASANT PICTURE BUT NOT A NEW ONE. SHUEKBRUGH HAD:

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ACTION	EUR	ACTION	Note d		DIRECTIONS	Filp
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NAME OF OFFICER		DATE OF ACTION	24 July 1962			
OFFICE SYMBOL	GER-75 Park					

SECRET

-2- SECTION 41, JULY 23, 9 AM FROM GENEVA

SHUCKBRUGH HAD SLIGHT IMPRESSION THAT SOVS SLOWING DOWN THEIR PACE OR AT LEAST IMPLYING NO URGENCY.

3. GROMYKO'S FORMULATION OF GDR SOVEREIGNTY AS "VITAL INTEREST" OF USSR WAS RELATIVELY NOVEL. OTHER NEW THEMES WERE RENEWED EMPHASIS ON NATO-BERLIN RELATIONSHIP AND LINK BETWEEN "SECURITY OF USSR" AND END OF WEST BERLIN OCCUPATION.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM KRAFF, KOHLER SAID THAT SECRETARY'S EMPHASIS ON ALLIED SUSPENSION BERLIN CLAUSES OF GRUNDGESETZ BORE NO RELATIONSHIP TO QUESTION OF PRESENT FRG TIES TO BERLIN WHICH WERE "NOT AN ISSUE AT THIS POINT".

5. GERMANS PROFESSED TO SEE SOME CHANGE IN SOV POSITION IN THAT FORMULATION ON CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE TREATY IN GROMYKO STATEMENT WAS "REGARDED" RATHER THAN "CONSIDERED" WHEN REFERRING TO BERLIN AS FREE CITY.

6. KOHLER SUGGESTED THAT LORD HOME NOT BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION ACCESS WITH GROMYKO AS THIS WOULD CREATE UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION THAT WEST IS SEEKING SOME GUARANTEE ON ACCESS WHICH MIGHT THUS ENCOURAGE SOVS TO PROCEED WITH TREATY.

7. KOHLER STRESSED THAT GROMYKO TWICE AVOIDED ANSWERING SECRETARY'S DIRECT QUESTION WHETHER PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN AND ACCESS THERETO WOULD IN ANY WAY BE AFFECTED BY USSR AND SOME OTHER STATES SIGNING A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY. BOTH TIMES GROMYKO MERELY REPEATED THAT WEST WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH SOVEREIGN GDR, NOT USSR, ON ALL MATTERS OF INTEREST, INCLUDING ACCESS.

8. LAST POINT STRESSED WAS THAT GROMYKO'S RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT BOTH SIDES THINK ABOUT PROBLEM OVERNIGHT WAS NEXT MORNING TO INVITE SECRETARY TO LUNCH JULY 24.

RUSH

SJR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO SS-O 7/24/62 PEP

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